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Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 








 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 William Marroquin-Cordova (“Marroquin”) argues that his uncles will persecute 
and torture him because he is a member of a particular social group (“PSG”) comprised 
of descendants of his grandfather and because of his political affiliation with the Patriot 
Party.  We agree with the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) that Marroquin failed to demonstrate a nexus to a statutorily protected ground.  It 
appears that his uncles targeted him out of greed and other economic resentment, not out 
of an animus toward the alleged PSG, nor because of his political opinion.  For that 
reason, the IJ and BIA denied his claim for withholding of removal.  The IJ and BIA also 
appropriately held that Marroquin’s claim for relief under the Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”) lacks merit because he did not show that the authorities would 
acquiesce in torture.  We will therefore deny the petition for review. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 Marroquin grew up with his parents and four siblings in Santa Cruz El Chol, Baja 
Verapaz, Guatemala.  He is a member of the Patriot Party and, in 2014, began working on 
the second election campaign of Mayor Hector Adolfo Mayen-Alvarado (“Mayor 
Mayen”), who won elections in 2012 and 2016.  Marroquin also worked for the local 
government in 2014 and 2015 as the Assistant of Public Services and the Promoter of 
Sports and Recreation, which were desirable government positions.   
 
1 The following is drawn primarily from Marroquin’s removal hearing testimony 
and is consistent with the IJ’s findings of fact.   
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 He describes his uncles Raul and Pedro Cordova threatening to kill him “a lot of 
times” between 2014 and 2016, which eventually drove him out of Guatemala.  (AR at 
131.)  He explained that his uncles were jealous of his government positions, given that 
they had lost their positions as bodyguards for the previous mayor of 16 years, who was a 
member of the competing Leader Party.2  Additionally, they were envious of Marroquin’s 
potential claim to land previously owned by his grandfather, who died in 2019.  That land 
was supposedly devised to Marroquin’s father, his uncle Raul, and another uncle, 
Nicholas, who has since died.  Although Marroquin expressed some uncertainty as to the 
devisees, which may have included his uncle Pedro, he was confident that his father 
inherited a portion of the property, and that he, Marroquin, might then inherit his father’s 
portion.  His uncles Pedro and Raul did not “want to give anyone any share of” his 
grandfather’s property, desiring it for themselves.  (AR at 134.)  Marroquin believed that 
to be the reason why his cousin, the son of his uncle Nicholas, was murdered after 
Nicholas’s death.  Marroquin testified that his cousin had told him shortly before his 
death that Raul and Pedro were making threats.  Marroquin says that his father has not 
been killed, despite continuing to live in Guatemala, for a few reasons: because he may 
not have taken the land, because Raul and Pedro would not want to kill their brother, and 
because they see his father as a “good person.”3  (AR at 139.)   
 
2 He noted that, though he had previously had “small problems” with his uncles, 
those problems worsened after Mayor Mayen was elected and Marroquin started working 
for him.  (AR at 148.) 
 
3 Marroquin’s father submitted a statement, attached to Marroquin’s application, 
but made no mention of inherited property, only claiming that he purchased land in 2008 
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 After two years of threatening to kill him, Marroquin’s uncles showed up at a 
soccer match where Marroquin was working, armed with guns.  He escaped by 
motorcycle, claiming that townspeople attending the game stopped his uncles from 
getting to him.  He did not return home because his uncles would occasionally (and 
continued thereafter to) fire guns at his house.  He remained in Guatemala, but not in his 
home, for roughly another month.  Marroquin did not file a report with the police and 
said that no one else had done so because his uncles have influence over the police and 
retained power from their former government jobs.  He also did not ask the Mayor for 
help with the threats against him, thinking the Mayor “wouldn’t be able to give [him] that 
help.”  (AR at 143-44.)  He did, however, inform the Mayor’s office that he was leaving 
his job due to the threats by his uncles.  Even after arriving in the United States, he has 
continued to receive threats over Facebook and WhatsApp.  He believes the threats are 
from his uncles acting under different identities.   
 Marroquin was ordered removed after his arrival in the United States, in 
September 2016, and he was in fact promptly removed.  He illegally reentered the 
country in December 2016.  In November 2019, the Department of Homeland Security 
 
and sold that land in 2012.  He mentioned economic extortion by gangs, but not from 
Marroquin’s uncles.  He did say that some family members were jealous of his land, 
including “Raul and Pedro Cordova, … who were upset that I owned this land and they 
took out their anger on my son, William [Marroquin-Cordova].”  (AR at 232.)  
Marroquin had not spoken to his father before or after the statement but theorized that his 
father’s focus on gangs was out of fear that Raul and Pedro would kill him if he made a 
declaration against them.  Marroquin also testified that his father later sent his two 
younger brothers to live in the United States because he “was afraid that when they 
reached adulthood they would be receiving the same threats that I was receiving.”  (AR at 
162.) 
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issued a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Removal Order and shortly 
thereafter Marroquin completed a reasonable fear interview.  His case was referred to an 
IJ based on that interview.  He applied for withholding of removal and relief under the 
CAT, and a hearing was held in February 2020.   
 Although the IJ noted inconsistencies between Marroquin’s testimony and his 
father’s statement, he found Marroquin credible.  Nevertheless, after evaluating 
Marroquin’s withholding claim, the IJ concluded that “any harm that Mr. Marroquin 
contends would befall if he was returned to Guatemala is based not on any protected 
basis but instead based on personal conflicts or criminal acts or extortion.”  (App. at 12.)  
He also rejected Marroquin’s contention the PSG of “descendants of [Marroquin’s] 
grandfather,” or a “political opinion” based on Marroquin’s party affiliation, was a 
central basis of his alleged persecution, finding instead that jealousy of land inheritance 
was the primary cause of his uncles’ threats.  (App. at 11-13.)  Additionally, the IJ noted 
that other members of the alleged PSG, such as Marroquin’s father, suffered no 
persecution, and that it is speculative whether Marroquin would even inherit the property 
his uncles allegedly covet.  Likewise, the IJ found Marroquin’s PSG not cognizable 
because “there are multiple descendants [of his] grandfather” who are not being 
threatened or persecuted, “includ[ing] … his two brothers and sister, his father and the 
persecutors themselves.”  (App. at 14.)  Lastly, the IJ rejected Marroquin’s claim for 
relief under the CAT because he “failed to illustrate that any harm that he would face 
would be at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”  
(App. at 16.) 
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 The BIA affirmed the denial of Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim, stating 
that “[t]he familial relationship has not been shown to be the motivating force for the 
threats, given that only some potential inheritors of the land were targets of threats[,]” 
and noting that Marroquin’s father was not afraid of his brothers.  (App. at 5.)  It rejected 
Marroquin’s request to provide corroborating evidence, because even if Marroquin were 
given an opportunity to corroborate his claim that his uncles murdered his cousin, that 
evidence would not change the personal nature of his uncles’ threats against both him and 
his cousin.  And it concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that “the threats 
against the applicant existed before he began working for the mayor, which [it said] 
undermines his argument that his uncles targeted him due to his political opinion.”  (App. 
at 5-6.)  It similarly affirmed the IJ’s CAT holding.  Marroquin has timely petitioned for 
review.   
II. DISCUSSION4 
 Marroquin argues that the IJ and BIA erred in denying both his withholding of 
removal and his CAT claims.  The government responds, and we agree, that the IJ and 
 
4 We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 
and Marroquin’s reinstated order of removal is the equivalent of a final order.  See 
Debeato v. Att’y Gen., 505 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 1252(a)(2)(D) … 
permits us to exercise jurisdiction over … final orders that the Attorney General has 
reinstated pursuant to § 1231(a)(5).”).  Constitutional claims and questions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011).  Factual 
findings of the agency are reviewed for substantial evidence.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2011).  That means findings of fact must be 
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as 
a whole.”  Garcia, 665 F.3d at 502 (internal citations omitted).  “We may only consider 
the reasons provided by the [BIA], but where the [BIA] both adopts the findings of the 
[IJ] and discusses some of the bases for the [IJ’s] decision, we have authority to review 
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BIA appropriately concluded that there is no nexus between Marroquin’s withholding of 
removal claim and his alleged PSG or political opinion.  We also agree with the IJ’s and 
BIA’s holding that the CAT claim fails because Marroquin has not established that the 
authorities would acquiesce in any alleged torture he says he will suffer if he is removed 
to Guatemala. 
A. The IJ and BIA Properly Denied Withholding of Removal. 
 Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim lacks nexus to a PSG because his 
evidence shows that his uncles were not motivated by his being a descendant of his 
grandfather.  Nor has he shown that they threatened him based on their differences in 
political affiliation.  Instead, the evidence shows that, if anything, his uncles were 
motivated by economic jealousy over his potential property rights and his government 
patronage positions.  They were aware of his economic and professional situation 
because they were part of the same family unit, but kinship ties must be more than the 
basis of knowledge about a victim; they must be a central reason for the persecution.5 
 
the decisions of both the [IJ] and the [BIA].”  Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 734 
(3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
5 In his briefing, Marroquin additionally argues that remand is required for the IJ 
to more fully consider his asserted PSG and because the BIA erred in not considering 
whether Marroquin had experienced past persecution.  The government acknowledges in 
supplemental briefing that it has waived any defense to a challenge by Marroquin of the 
agency’s finding on the cognizability of his asserted PSG.  Instead, it asks that we assume 
cognizability and rule on lack of nexus, which we do herein.  Marroquin also argues he 
should have been given the opportunity to corroborate his claim that his uncles murdered 
his cousin.  The BIA rejected that argument because such corroboration would not 
change the IJ’s nexus holding, and we agree. 
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 A noncitizen pursuing withholding of removal “bears the burden of proving that 
he will more likely than not face persecution on account of … [a] protected ground[].”  
Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 (3d Cir. 2015).  This means that the 
protected ground was “a central reason for [the alleged] persecution[.]”  Matter of A-B-, 
27 I.&N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018).  Those protected grounds include “race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, [and] political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).  “Conflicts of a personal nature and isolated criminal acts do not 
constitute persecution on account of a protected characteristic.”  Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 
F.3d at 685; see also Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 342 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(“[P]etitioner’s fear of personal conflict … does not suffice to entitle him to relief[.]”).  
The motivations of a persecutor are a question of fact, while the ultimate determination of 
whether those motivations have a nexus to a protected ground is a question of law.  See 
Matter of N-M-, 25 I.&N. Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011) (“A persecutor’s actual motive is a 
matter of fact to be determined by the [IJ] and reviewed by us for clear error.”); see also 
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have a very deferential 
standard of review of the BIA’s findings of fact and may only reverse these findings if 
the evidence compels us to do so[.]”).  
 Marroquin claims that he was persecuted because he is part of a PSG defined as 
descendants of his grandfather.  The evidence does not support that.  He testified that his 
uncles (who are also part of that same alleged PSG) wanted land that he stood to inherit 
from his father, and so they targeted him as well as certain other family members who 
also stood to inherit a share of that property, such as his cousin.  But his evidence shows 
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that his uncles did not target all members of the family, only those in line to inherit land, 
and only individuals in Marroquin’s generation.  Assuming the truth of his story, his 
uncles’ motivation was quite clearly economic.  In other words, they did not threaten 
Marroquin because he is in his grandfather’s bloodline; they threatened him because he is 
supposedly going to inherit property.  Marroquin even noted that they did not target his 
father, despite his father’s more immediate claim to the land.  Marroquin’s father’s 
declaration is consistent on this point, as is testimony from Marroquin during his removal 
hearing and in his I-589 application.  (See, e.g., AR at 232 (declaration by Marroquin’s 
father that “Raul and Pedro Cordova, for example, were family members who were upset 
that I owned … land and they took out their anger on my son, William”); AR at 134 
(testimony of Marroquin that the “dispute and problems [started] because … my uncles, 
they want to inherit the entire land [and] don’t want to give anyone any share of it”); AR 
at 374 (reporting in the I-589 application that he “fear[s] that if [he] return[s] to 
Guatemala, [his] uncles will threaten to and seek to kill [him]” because they “want the 
land that [he] will inherit from [his] father”).) 
 Marroquin also argued that his persecution was on account of his political opinion 
because he supported a mayor of a different party than the party for whom his uncles 
worked.  That alleged nexus is, again, not supported by the evidence, which demonstrated 
only that Marroquin’s uncles lost their patronage positions with the government at about 
the same time Marroquin gained his, and they were therefore jealous of his good fortune.  
Although Marroquin’s uncles supported a different political party, he did not testify or 
present any evidence that their alleged persecution was driven by political disagreement.  
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(See AR at 129-30 (testifying that his uncles were “jealous of [his] position[s],” which 
were “good jobs[,]” “[b]ecause they previously worked for the municipality and they 
were then at that time unemployed and so because of jealousy, they wanted to try to harm 
[him]”); AR at 130 (“They threatened me because they stated that they felt jealous -- 
jealousy that I had that position because previously they had worked as body guards for 
the previous mayor.”).)  The IJ rejected Marroquin’s claims of nexus to political opinion 
for that reason.  (See App. at 13 (“Even though Raul and Pedro … were purported 
members of ‘The Leader’ party and had what appeared to be patronage positions as 
bodyguards to the prior mayor, there is no evidence that … Marroquin’s … political 
activities … were the basis for any harm, threats or other adverse activities[.]”).  We 
therefore agree with the IJ and the BIA that Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim 
lacks merit due to lack of nexus to a protected ground. 
B. The IJ and BIA Properly Denied Relief under the Convention Against 
Torture. 
 Eligibility for protection under the CAT requires an applicant to show “it is more 
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 
removal.”  Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).  The applicant must also show that the 
government will acquiesce to such torture, meaning he “must demonstrate that, prior to 
the activity constituting torture, a public official was aware of it and thereafter breached 
his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent it.”  Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2020).  “The applicant can meet this standard even where the 
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government does not have actual knowledge of the torturous activity if he produc[es] 
sufficient evidence that the government [ ] is willfully blind to such activities.”  Myrie v. 
Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Findings concerning how government officials will respond to any mistreatment are 
factual, while the question of whether that response constitutes acquiescence is a legal 
one.  Id. at 516-17. 
 Marroquin argues that the BIA’s decision provides too little explanation to 
adequately address his arguments.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 517 (“In order for us to be able 
to give meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some insight into its 
reasoning.” (quoting Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003)).  He also 
argues that the BIA’s findings under the CAT are not supported by substantial evidence, 
because it “overlooked evidence explaining why [he] never sought help from the police.”  
(Opening Br. at 35.)  He says that the BIA should have looked to his testimony “that his 
uncles have a lot of influence over the police, and that the police would be afraid to act in 
defiance of them.”  (Opening Br. at 35 (citing AR at 141).)  As support for his argument, 
he notes that he informed the office of the Mayor that he would not return to work 
because his uncles were trying to hurt him, and he says he submitted country conditions 
articles and a Department of State report on police corruption and inefficacy.   
 Contrary to Marroquin’s complaint, however, the IJ and BIA adequately explained 
their holdings.  The IJ held that “the facts and evidence [do not] indicate that … the 
threats constituted torture” and that Marroquin “has failed to illustrate that any harm that 
he would face would be at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
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public official.”  (App. at 16.)  The IJ further explained that Marroquin never sought help 
from the police, nor did he seek help from the political leaders for whom he worked.  He 
reasoned that Marroquin’s bare testimony that the authorities could not or would not help 
was not enough to demonstrate acquiescence.  The BIA affirmed that conclusion, noted 
the IJ’s reasoning, and cited to the relevant portion of the IJ’s decision.  That is sufficient 
for our review, Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004), and sufficient to 
support the denial of CAT relief. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Marroquin’s petition for review. 
